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APPLYING GENEVA CONVENTION PRINCIPLES TO
GUANTANAMO BAY
Kyndra Rotunda *
I. INTRODUCTION

During this election year, both presidential candidates, Senators Barack Obama and John McCain, favored closing the U.S.operated detention camp in Guantdnamo Bay.1 Support for closing the detention camp stemmed from a perceived failure of the
United States to follow the rule of law with respect to detainees
held there.2 In fact, the Senate Judiciary Committee recently held
hearings to explore ways of Restoring the Rule of Law in GuantAnamo Bay.3 But, before the United States can explore ways to repair what is wrong with the detention camp in Guantdnamo Bay,
it must consider whether, and to what extent, the rule of law currently exists in Guantinamo Bay.
This article analyzes and discusses the procedures the United
States follows in Guantdnamo Bay and compares those procedures to the ones that prisoners of war ("POWs") would receive in
accordance with the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.4 It examines four particular areas:
Combatant Status Review Tribunals, Annual Review Boards, re-

* Kyndra Rotunda is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Law at Chapman University
School of Law, a Major in the Army JAG Corps, Individual Ready Reserves, and author of
HONOR BOUND: INSIDE THE GUANTANAMO TRIALS (2008). Portions of this article were
adapted from HONOR BOUND.
1. Josh Meyer, Candidates'Anti-TerrorViews Are Largely Similar,L.A. TIMES, Sept.
11, 2008, at Al.
2. See Restoring the Rule of Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 1 (2008) (statement of Sen. Russell D. Feingold, Chairman, Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
3. See generally Restoring the Rule of Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 1 (2008).
4. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War].
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ligious accommodation, and camp discipline. Whether or not
enemy combatants held in Guantdnamo Bay are entitled to POW
protections, they are receiving substantially the same, or in some
cases greater, procedural protections than the Geneva Conventions require for POWs.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
While the term "law of war" may seem like an oxymoron, it is
not. The law of war, which essentially governs the battlefield, exists primarily in two forms: (1) international treaties and (2) customary international law.5 The United States is a party to about a
dozen international treaties, including the four Geneva Conventions.6 Resolving disputes between nation states is much simpler
when an international treaty governs the parties because parties
can look to the particular terms in the particular treaty-as parties to a contract would.
Customary international law is the second principle source of
the law of war and is not so straightforward. Customary international law describes generally accepted, unwritten principles,
which "stem from the lessons of history,"7 and are followed by
most nation states. It is not codified the way that treaties are, but
exists by general consent from various nation states.8 Countries
look to evidence such as diplomatic correspondence, judicial decisions in each country, and the writings of judges and academics to
determine what falls within the realm of customary international
law and what falls outside of that realm.9

5.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 (1987); Robert A. Bai-

ley, Why Do States Violate the Law of War?: A Comparison of Iraqi Violations in Two Gulf
Wars, 27 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 103, 103, 105 (2000).

6. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, supra note 4; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, opened for signatureAug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
7.
8.

DEP'T OF THE ARMY, TRAINING CIRCULAR 27-10-2, PRISONERS OF WAR 3 (1991).
DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 4 (1956)

[hereinafter FIELD MANUAL].
9. Id. at 6.
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Whether a captured enemy qualifies as a POW, and what procedural protections apply, is governed by an international treaty-The Third Geneva Convention of 1949, Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War.1" But, the notion of protections for
POWs did not simply emerge out of nothingness. It evolved over
time. The concept of a POW did not exist in ancient times.1 Captors considered their captives property, and either killed or enslaved them.' 2 We do not know exactly when captors began holding enemy prisoners, but experts believe that the 1785 Treaty of
Friendship between the United States and Prussia was the first
agreement setting forth treatment guidelines for enemy prisoners.

13

During the American Civil War, President Lincoln issued General Order Number 100, Instructions of the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, which was also known as
the Lieber Code.1 4 It required Union forces to treat captured Confederate troops humanely. 5 The Lieber Code influenced Europe,
which adopted the 1907 Hague Regulations, affording some protections to POWs. 6 But, the protections were basic and it was not
until 1929 that they were supplemented by the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.1 7 After the
Nazis committed atrocities against POWs during World War II,
the Geneva Conventions were revised and the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 emerged, including the Geneva Convention III,
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, which is binding
today."

10. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 4,
art. 4(A)(2); see Kevin H. Govern & Eric C. Bales, Taking Shots at PrivateMilitary Firms:
InternationalLaw Misses Its Mark (Again), 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 55, 69 (2008).
11.

JEAN DE PREUX ET AL., COMMENTARY, III GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE

TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 45 (Jean S. Pictet ed., A.P. de Heney trans. 1960) [hereinafter GENEVA III COMMENTARY]; BRIAN J. BILL ET AL., LAW OF WAR WORKSHOP
DESKBOOK 69 (Brian J. Bill ed., William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 2004) (2000).
12. BILL ET AL., supranote 11, at 69.
13. Id. at 70.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 71.
17.

Id.

18.

See id. at 72.
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III. DEFINING PRISONERS OF WAR
What does it mean to be a POW and who qualifies? The Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War includes a four-part test to determine whether fighters-who are
not members of the regular armed forces-qualify as POWs.19 According to that test, one must meet the following four criteria to
be considered a POW: "(a) that of being commanded by a person
responsible for his subordinates; (b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) that of carrying arms
openly; (d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with
the laws and customs of war."2" Commentary to Article 4 calls it
"the key to the Convention, since it defines the people entitled to
be treated as [POWs]," which makes clear that combatants not
meeting the requirements contained in Article 4 are not entitled
to POW treatment. 21
But what does each of these prongs mean? Commentary to the
Geneva Conventions describes and explains each of the four criteria that combatants must meet to be properly deemed POWs. The
first prong makes clear that only troops that are "commanded by
22
a person responsible for his subordinates" can qualify as POWs.
The Commentary explains this requirement. It states that the
"commander" can be either civilian or military, but must be "responsible for action taken on his orders."23 Commentators opine
that this requirement provides "reasonable assurance24 that the
other conditions ... [of the POW test] will be observed."
Regarding the second prong of the test-the requirement to
wear fixed distinctive insignia-the Commentary states that
"having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance ... [is]

19. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 4,
art. 4(A)(2). Members of the regular armed forces of a party to the conflict receive POW
protections under the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
Id. art. 4(A)(1). Even persons accompanying the regular armed forces, including civilians,
receive POW protections so long as they have received authorization from the armed forces
that they accompany and have an identity card indicating such. Id. art. 4(A)(4).
20. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 4,
art. 4(a)(2)(a)-(d).
21. GENEVA III COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 49.
22. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 4,
art. 4(A)(2)(a).
23. GENEVA III COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 59.
24. Id.
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an essential factor of loyalty in the struggle and must be worn
constantly, in all circumstances."2 5 It goes on to explain that "the
sign must be the same for all the members of any one resistance
organization, and must be used only by that organization."26 The
Commentators explain that this sign could be a cap, an armband, a shirt, an emblem, or any other distinctive mark that an
opponent could recognize from a distance.2 7 Thus, under the Geneva Convention, one must fight in uniform--or something like
it-in order to meet the second prong of the test for POW status.
The third prong of the test requires the enemy to carry his
arms openly.2" The Commentary states: "The enemy must be able
to recognize partisans as combatants in the same way as members of regular armed forces, whatever their weapons. Thus, a civilian could not enter a military post on a false pretext and then
open fire, having taken unfair advantage of his adversaries."29
This prong makes clear that enemy forces posing as civilians to
gain a strategic advantage are not entitled to POW protections.
Finally, the fourth prong requires enemy forces to conduct their
operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.3" The
Commentary calls this an "essential provision" and explains that,
among other things, "[tihey may not attack civilians or disarmed
persons and must, in all their operations, respect the principles of
honour and loyalty as they expect their enemies to do."'" Thus,
according to the Geneva Conventions, those who employ suicide
bombs and attack innocent civilians are not POWs and are not
entitled to POW protections.32
Therefore, under the four-part test contained in the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
whether a captured enemy is entitled to POW protections is a
straightforward question that requires a rather simple analysis.

25. Id.
26. Id. at 60.
27. Id.
28. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 4,
art. 4(A)(2)(c).
29.

GENEVA III COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 61.

30. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 4,
art. 4(A)(2)(d).
31. GENEVA III COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 61.
32. See John Yoo & James Ho, The Status of Terrorists, VA. J. INT'L L. 207, 215-20
(2003) (discussing the application of the four-part test contained in article 4(A)(2) of the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 4).
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However, the debate does not end there. In 1977, 143 nations
drafted and signed Protocol I to supplement the Geneva Conventions. 33 The United States did not sign or ratify Protocol I, but
some maintain that Protocol I is customary international law
and, therefore, trumps Geneva's four-part POW test.34
Protocol I eviscerates the POW test articulated in the Third
Geneva Convention. Specifically, Article 44 of Protocol I provides
that any combatant taking part in an armed conflict "who falls in35
to the power of an adverse Party shall be a prisoner of war."
Under this protocol, any combatant, regardless of whether he
wears a uniform or attacks innocent civilians to gain a strategic
advantage, receives POW protections. It thus gives POW protections to guerillas.36
Under the Geneva Convention four-part test, enemy combatants fighting against U.S. forces in Afghanistan are not entitled
to POW protections because they did not wear uniforms, or any
distinctive insignia. In contrast, under Protocol I, they would be
entitled to POW protections. Regardless of whether the Geneva
Conventions or Protocol I are a proper expression of international
law, has the United States nonetheless extended POW protections to detainees held in Guantinamo Bay? Is it adhering to the
Geneva Conventions?
IV. ARTICLE 5 HEARINGS AND COMBATANT STATUS
REVIEW TRIBUNALS

Under the Geneva Conventions, how does the capturing power
apply the POW four-part test? What procedures, if any, govern
their decision? Article 5 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War allows, when doubt exists, the detaining power to hold a brief status hearing, where a "competent
tribunal" will decide whether the detainee is a POW." The draf-

33. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, adopted on June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I].
34. For a brief discussion of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I, see GREGORY E.
MAGGS, TERRORISM AND THE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS app. c, at 585-87 (2005).

35. Protocol I, supra note 33, art. 44.
36.

BILL ET AL., supra note 11, at 76-77.

37. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 4,
art. 5. Article 5 provides:
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ters initially proposed that one person acting alone-some "responsible authority"-could determine the status of an enemy
prisoner. 8 But, at Geneva in 1949, the drafters decided to replace
the term "responsible authority" with "competent tribunal" so
that more than one person would decide the status of captured
combatants .
Aside from requiring that a "competent tribunal" be made up of
more than one person, the Commentary does not provide any
guidelines to govern the hearings and it does not describe or define a "competent tribunal." The drafters seemed satisfied that
few cases would require such hearings, stating that the POW
four-part test in Article 4 would "reduce the number of doubtful
cases in any future conflict," and that in any event, "this provision should not be interpreted too restrictively."4 0
Therefore, Article 5 would allow the capturing power to decide
whether sufficient doubt exists to hold a status hearing and presumably, any hearing with more than one official presiding would
suffice. Whether one meets the four-part POW test is, on its face,
a straightforward question of fact.
The United States adopted procedures to govern status hearings because the Geneva Conventions provide only minimal
guidelines for the detaining power. U.S. policy is to convene a
three-member panel to decide the status of detainees. 41 It specifies that a detainee "who asserts that he or she is entitled to
treatment as a prisoner of war" will receive a status hearing, even
when the status of that person does not appear to be in doubt.4 2
Thus, the United States allows the detainee's request to trigger a
status hearing, where the Geneva Conventions allow captors to
make that decision based on the facts.

Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the
categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of
the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined
by a competent tribunal.

Id.
38. GENEVA III COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 77.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 77-78.
41. BILL ET AL., supra note 11, at 78; FIELD MANUAL, supra note 8, at 19 para. 71(c).
42. DEP'TS OF THE ARMY, THE NAVY, THE AIR FORCE, AND THE MARINE CORPS, ARMY
REGULATION 190-8, ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR, RETAINED PERSONNEL, CIVILIAN INTERNEES AND OTHER DETAINEES ch. 1, § 1-6(b) (1997) [hereinafter ARMY REGULATION 190-8].
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U.S. regulations specify that a "competent tribunal" will be
composed of "three commissioned officers, one of whom must be of
a field grade"-at least the rank of a Major, 0-4, or above. 43 The
U.S. rules also prefer that an officer of the Judge Advocate General Corps-a lawyer-is involved. 44 The Geneva Conventions only require more than one person to decide the detainee's status
and accept that those making the decision might be of a subordinate rank.45
The U.S. rules further require the detainee to be "advised of...
[his] rights at the beginning of [the] hearings [;] "46 specify that the
sessions will be open and that the detainee will receive an interpreter; 47 allow the detainee to call and question reasonably available witnesses; 4 guarantee, but do not compel, the detainee a
right to testify; 49 and require that the detainee's status is decided
in a closed session, by majority vote, using a preponderance of the
evidence standard.5" They also require that a Judge Advocate
General Officer review the written record "for legal sufficiency."51
Clearly, the U.S. rules put meat on the bones of Article 5 status
hearings by specifying additional rights and procedures for the
detainee than the Geneva Conventions require.
V. THE HAMDI CASE-STATUS HEARINGS FOR U.S. CITIZENS

In 2004, the Supreme Court of the United States considered
the status of one detainee, Yaser Esam Hamdi, in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld Before September 11, 2001, Mr. Hamdi, an American
citizen, traveled to Afghanistan.5 3 We do not know why he went to

43. Id. ch. 1, § 1-6(c).
44. Id.
45. GENEVA III COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 77 (explaining that the decision to
require a "competent tribunal" instead of a "responsible authority" rested, in part, on the
realization that "decisions which might have the gravest consequences should not be left
to a single person, who might often be of subordinate rank"). This suggests that the drafters did not mind leaving the decision to two persons, who might be of a subordinate rank.
46. ARMY REGULATION 190-8, supra note 42, ch. 1, § 1-6(e)(4).
47. Id. ch. 1, § 1-6(e)(5).
48. Id. ch. 1, § 1-6(e)(6).
49. Id. ch. 1, § 1-6(e)(7)-(8).
50. Id. ch. 1, § 1-6(e)(9).
51. Id. ch. 1, § 1-6(e)(10)(g).
52. 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004).
53. Id.
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Afghanistan in the first place. His father alleged that it was to
perform "relief work," but Hamdi never made that claim.5 4 Hamdi
said that he wanted to get military training so he could go to
Israel and kill Israelis.5" He wanted to join the Saudi Army,
which rejected him, so he went to Afghanistan.5 6
Sometime after the United States invaded Afghanistan, U.S.
forces captured Mr. Hamdi fighting alongside a Taliban unit. He
was armed with an assault rifle. 5' As it did with many detainees
captured in battle, the U.S. military eventually transferred Mr.
Hamdi to Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba.5 9 When U.S. officials discovered that he was an American citizen, they transferred him to a
naval brig in Norfolk, Virginia.6" The United States treated him
as an American citizen because he was born in the United
States.6
The question of what to do with this American A1-Qaeda member caused a series of court cases that eventually reached the Supreme Court. The nine Supreme Court Justices could not reach a
majority decision concerning Hamdi's status; however, Justice
O'Connor wrote a plurality opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer.6 2 Justice O'Connor's
opinion first discussed the definition of "enemy combatant" and
defined the term as one who the government alleges was "'part of
or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners' [in Afghanistan] and 'engaged in an armed conflict against

54. Id. at 511.
55. Id. at 512-13; Ronald Rotunda, The Detainee Cases of 2004 and 2006 and Their
Aftermath, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 15 n.86 (2006).
56. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 512-13; Ronald Rotunda, supra note 55, at 15 n.86.
57. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 513; Ronald Rotunda, supranote 55, at 15 n.86.
58. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 513; Ronald Rotunda, supra note 55, at 15 n.86.
59. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510.
60. Id.
61. Id. Neither of his parents were Americans, but the Fourteenth Amendment states
that "[aill persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Court has interpreted the language to make all persons born
in the United States U.S. citizens-except those born of foreign embassy personnel who
are not subject to U.S. jurisdiction. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 693
(1898).
62. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509.
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Alternatively, Justice Thomas indicated

that he would defer to the military for all battlefield captures.64
The Court affirmed its earlier decision in the World War II case
of Ex parte Quirin65 and concluded that the United States may
detain enemy combatants during war time without charging
them with any crimes.66 However, regarding U.S. citizens like
Hamdi, the Court required the military to apply some procedures
that ensure the detainee is an enemy combatant. 67 The procedures could be basic and the government can assume that the detainee is an enemy combatant. That is, unless the detainee
presents compelling evidence otherwise, the United States can
hold him, so long as it affords the detainee a fair opportunity to
present his view of things. 6' The plurality specified that the purpose for such a hearing is to protect "the errant tourist, embedded
journalist, or local aid worker" by giving detainees a fair opportunity to be heard, but leaves the burden of proof on the detainee.69
The plurality did not say that detainees were entitled to lawyers. This is not surprising. After all, when a grand jury decides
whether probable cause exists to indict a person, the grand jury
can question that person without a lawyer present.7 ° If that person has a lawyer, the lawyer can sit in the next room and wait.71
Neither Article 5 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War nor ARMY REGULATION 190-8 require lawyers to represent detainees at their status hearings.7

63. Id. at 526 (quoting Brief for the Respondents at 3, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507 (2004) (No. 03-6696)).

64. See id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
65.

317 U.S. 1 (1942).

66. See Handi, 542 U.S. at 516-19.
67.

Id. at 509 (plurality opinion) ("We hold that although Congress authorized the de-

tention of combatants in the narrow circumstances alleged here, due process demands that
a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker."). Detainee Hamdi had not received an Article 5 hearing or a hearing consistent with Army
Regulation 190-8. Id. at 510.
68.

See id. at 533-34.

69. Id. at 534.
70.

See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d)(1).
See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL, tit. 9, §
11.151 (1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/foia-reading-room/usam/title9/title
9.htm.

71.
72.

See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note

4, art. 5; ARMY REGULATION 190-8, supra note 42, ch. 1, 1-6.
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The Supreme Court plurality opinion emphasized that the procedures could be simple and should not interfere with an ongoing
war. 73 Along these lines, the hearing would occur sometime after
capture and it could consider documents drawn up by soldiers
who captured the detainee on the battlefield. 74 The plurality suggested that the proceedings outlined in an existing ARMY
REGULATION 190-8, section 1-6, would satisfy this minimal
process due. 7' Therefore, the United States can hold a U.S. citizen
captured on the battlefield so long as the government affords him
an opportunity to rebut the presumption that he is an enemy
combatant.76
The plurality did not reach a conclusion about what procedures
the government should afford detainees held in Guantdinamo
Bay-i.e., non-U.S. citizen enemy combatants. Are the Taliban
members that fought alongside Hamdi entitled to similar hearings? Perhaps not. If the Supreme Court intended the approximately 600 detainees to receive a Hamdi-like hearing, presumably it would have said so. Additionally, the plurality would not
have cautioned that its holding was narrow.7 7
Although Hamdi did not require status hearings for non-U.S.
citizens, the Department of Defense ("DoD") nonetheless decided
to grant such hearings to all detainees held in Guantdnamo Bay.78
Within one week of the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdi, Paul
Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, created the Office of
Administrative Review for Detained Enemy Combatants
("OARDEC"), under the supervision of the Secretary of the Navy,
Gordon England.79

73. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533-35.
74. See id. at 533-34.
75. Id. at 538 (citing ARMY REGULATION 190-8, supra note 42, ch. 1, § 1-6) ("There remains the possibility that the standards we have articulated could be met by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military tribunal. Indeed, it is notable that
military regulations already provide for such process in related instances, dictating that
tribunals be made available to determine the status of enemy detainees who assert prisoner-of-war status under the Geneva Convention.").
76. See id. at 533-34.
77. Id. at 516 ("We therefore answer only the narrow question before us: whether the
detention of citizens falling within that definition is authorized.").
78. Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec'y of Def., to the Sec'y of the Navy,
Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal (July 7, 2004) [hereinafter Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz], available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20
040707review.pdf.
79. See id.
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OARDEC held hearings for every detainee, called Combatant
Status Review Tribunals ("CSRTs"), that were based on Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion, the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Article 5 procedures, and
ARMY REGULATION 190-8.8" However, the CSRT proceedings went
further than the Supreme Court required in Hamdi, and further
than the Geneva Conventions or ARMY REGULATION 190-8 require, by appointing each detainee a personal representative to
assist with the hearing."1 This is unprecedented and not required
by any law.
In July of 2004, the U.S. military began holding CSRT hearings
for the approximately 600 detainees held in Guantdnamo Bay. 2
However, unilaterally adopting an untested process came with
risks and wrinkles and, ironically, resulted in greater procedural
protections for non-citizen detainees than the Supreme Court required for citizen detainees like Hamdi and greater protections
than ARMY REGULATION 190-8 ordinarily affords to captured
enemies.
VI. ANNUAL REVIEW BOARDS-PAROLE BOARD PRECEDENT
The U.S. government went one step further and created yet
another layer of review, a super-CSRT for all detainees called
Annual Review Boards ("ARBs"), also under the direction of
OARDEC."3 Essentially, ARBs are annual parole board hearings
for every detainee. If the board decides a detainee no longer poses

80. See Press Briefing, U.S. Dep't of Def., Special Briefing on Combatant Status Review Tribunals (Mar. 29, 2005), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/tran
script.aspx?transcriptid=2504.
81. Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, supra note 78, at (c) ("Each detainee shall be
assigned a military officer, with the appropriate security clearance, as a personal representative for the purpose of assisting the detainee in connection with the review process
described herein.").
82.

Kathleen T. Rhem, Annual Reviews of Detainee Cases to Begin at Guantanamo,

AM. FORCES PRESS SERVICE, Oct. 1, 2004, http:/www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.as
px?id=25164.
83. Memorandum from Gordon England, Designated Civilian Official, Dep't of Def.,
Implementation of Administrative Review Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at
U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, (Sept. 14, 2004), availableat http://www.defense
link.mil/news/Sep2004/d2004O9l4adminreview.pdf.
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a threat, it can release him.' 4 Ironically, the procedures governing
the ARBs are significantly more complicated than CSRT procedures.
The U.S. government spent over fifteen million dollars the first
year to hold ARBs for every detainee and reviewed over 300,000
documents during these hearings." Despite the effort and cost of
ARBs, there is no legal authority or requirement for them. The
leader of OARDEC acknowledges this fact, calling ARBs "'unprecedented, historic, and discretionary.' ' 6
International law, including the Geneva Conventions governing treatment of POWs, does not require these blanket parole
board hearings. Indeed, the Geneva Conventions of 1929 did not
provide for parole in any instance. In the 1949 revisions to the
Conventions, the option of granting parole at the discretion of the
detaining power was included, "particularly in cases where this
may contribute to the improvement of their state of health.""
Those who are paroled are "bound on their personal honour scrupulously to fulfil ... the engagements of their paroles or promises." 8 On their personal honor? It is hard to imagine how that
term could be applied to anyone who has been captured fighting
with the Taliban or Al-Qaeda, or any other organization that routinely refuses to follow the laws of war.
Parole opportunities under the Geneva Conventions are limited
and failing to pose a threat is not a justification for release. Similarly, the army regulation governing detained personnel allows
repatriation, but only of the sick and wounded, and only in limited circumstances.8 9 Under that regulation, only those suffering from "disabilities as a result of injury" equivalent to losing a
limb, or those with chronic conditions and a prognosis that precludes recovery within a year, are eligible for direct repatriation. 90
84.

Id. at enclosure (3).

85.

KYNDRA MILLER ROTUNDA, HONOR BOUND: INSIDE THE GUANTANAMO TRIALS 139

(2008).
86. Id. (quoting Rear Admiral James M. McGarrah, Commander of OARDEC, Public
Forum at George Mason Univ. (Feb. 16, 2006)).
87. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 4,
art. 21.
88. Id.
89. ARMY REGULATION 190-8, supra note 42, ch. 3, § 3-12(1).
90. Id. The regulation goes on to state: "Prisoners who are not sick or wounded will be
repatriated or released at the cessation of hostilities as directed by OSD [The Office of the
Secretary of Defense]." Id., ch. 3, § 3-13.
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The ARB process that paroles our enemies back to the battlefield
is not grounded in international law, the Geneva Conventions, or
army regulations governing retained personnel.
Not only are the ARBs a voluntary and unprecedented creation
of the DoD, but the decision to return an enemy combatant to the
battlefield endangers U.S. soldiers. Several detainees released
under the ARB process have rejoined the battle against U.S. and
coalition forces.9 1 The military has recaptured some detainees and
killed others on the battlefield. Some remain at large. The numbers are not precise because until soldiers either capture or kill a
paroled detainee, it is impossible to discern whether he has taken
up arms against the United States. Additionally, there is no way
to determine if, or how many, U.S. soldiers were injured or killed
at his hands before being killed or recaptured. However, we know
that approximately 5-10% of detainees released in the ARB
process have rejoined the battle-a fact acknowledged by the
DoD. 92 In fact, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Detainee Affairs
Division, declared in a public briefing that "'some of those re93
leased to date have already returned to the fight.'
Some say that the detainees are harmless, and if they join AlQaeda after the United States releases them, it is only because
their experience in Guantinamo Bay made them want to join AlQaeda. 94 The facts do not support this assumption. Detainees
whom the United States releases claim they have always been
committed members of A1-Qaeda and brag about this to report95
ers.

91. City on the Hill or Prison on the Bay? The Mistakes of Guantanamo and the Decline of America's Image, Part II: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on InternationalOrganizations, Human Rights, and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 92
(2008) (statement of Mark P. Denbeaux, Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of
Law).
92. KYNDRA MILLER ROTUNDA, supra note 85, at 140; see Editorial, Terrorist 'Rehab'
CHI. TRIB., Feb. 14, 2009, at C30.
93. KYNDRA MILLER ROTUNDA, supra note 85, at 140 (quoting Deputy Secretary of Defense, Detainee Affairs Policy Division, slides presented at a Feb. 16, 2006, public forum at
George Mason University).
94. See William Glaberson, Pentagon Study Sees Threat in Guantanamo Detainees,
N.Y. TiM-Es, July 26, 2007, at A16 (discussing and responding to claims that detainees do
not pose a threat).
95. See NBC Nightly News, Obama Closes Guantanamo, Authorizes Strike into Pakistan (NBC television broadcast Jan. 23, 2009).
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One released detainee killed a judge leaving a mosque in Afghanistan,96 and another assumed leadership of an Al-Qaedaaligned militant faction in Pakistan, bragging to reporters "that
he tricked his U.S. interrogators into believing he was someone
else." 97 Another Pakistani, Abdullah Mehsud, threatened violence
against U.S. forces only days after the United States released
him.9" He said, "'We would fight America and its allies'... 'until
the very end."'9 9 Mehsud backed his claim with action, claiming
responsibility for the kidnapping of two innocent Chinese engineers. 10 0 He eventually freed one and killed the other.1" 1 Considering that two known Pakistanis have reentered the battle, it is curious that the DoD characterizes detainee releases to Pakistan as
"successful," insisting that coordination with local villagers en10 2
sures that detainees will not return to the battlefield.
The military has released even high-level members of AlQaeda. In 2004, the United States released a known Al-Qaeda
loyalist known as "Tabarak" from Guantdnamo Bay into Moroccan custody, where he was set free four months later.' 3 Tabarak
was a chief aid to Osama bin Laden and helped plan and execute
bin Laden's escape from Tora Bora during December 2001. °4 During the escape, he made phone calls from bin Laden's satellite telephone, while A1-Qaeda leaders fled in the opposite direction.0 5
Neither U.S. nor Moroccan authorities will comment about the
specifics of Tabarak's release; therefore, we cannot verify whether
the ARB played a role in Tabarak's release. However, in either
case, the United States released a dangerous Al-Qaeda operative
from custody without any explanation. Recently, one detainee

96. Ex-Gitmo Detainees Return to Terror, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2004, http://washing
tontimes.com/news/2004/oct/18/20041018-124854-2279r/.
97. John Mintz, Released DetaineesRejoining the Fight, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 2004, at
Al.
98. See id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. KYNDRA MILLER ROTUNDA, supra note 85, at 140 (referring to statements made by
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Detainee Affairs Policy Division, at a Public Forum at
George Mason Univ. (Feb. 16, 2006)).
103. Craig Whitlock, Al Qaeda Detainee's Mysterious Release; Moroccan Spoke of Aiding Bin Laden During2001 Escape, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2006, at Al.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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whom the military released from Guantdnamo Bay has returned
to the battlefield and has assumed leadership of Al-Qaeda in Ye-

men. 106
It makes sense that released detainees would reenter the fight,
and research supports their propensity to do just that. Canadian
authorities have extensively documented recidivism of radical
Muslims.' 0 7 In January 2006, a senior Middle East Analyst for the
Canadian Security Intelligence Service, identified only as "P.G.,"
testified in an open court hearing about his agency's belief that
members of A1-Qaeda or other related militant Islamic groups
"maintain their ties, and their relationships to those networks, for
very long periods of time. These ties are forged in environments
where relationships mean a great deal, and it is our belief that the
dedication to the ideology,
if you will, is very strong, and is virtually
08
impossible to break."

He further opined that militants "'who have attended terrorist
training camps or ... opted for radical Islam must be considered
threats to Canadian public safety for the indefinite future."'10 9
P.G. also opined that incarceration tends to harden, not soften,
their radical Islamic beliefs."' He cited several examples where
radical Islamists emerged from prison more dangerous and committed to principles of radical Islam than they were going in."'
For instance, Ayman al-Zawahiri served a prison term in Egypt
for his role in the assassination of Anwar Sadat; after Egypt released him, Al-Qaeda elevated al-Zawahiri to become Osama bin
Laden's principal deputy." 2 Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi, leader of AlQaeda's affiliate in Iraq, previously spent seven years in a Jordanian prison for extremist activities." 3 Essentially, P.G. concludes
that it is categorically unsafe to ever release a jihadi militant."'

106.

Robert F. Worth, Freed by U.S., Saudi Becomes a Qaeda Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.

23, 2009, at Al.
107. Mark Hosenball, Once a Terrorist,Always a Terrorist? A Top Canadian Intelligence Official Says There's Little Hope of Rehabilitating Suspected Islamic Terrorists,
NEWSWEEK WEB EXCLUSIVE, Jan. 18, 2006.

108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111.

Id.

112.
113.

Id.
Id.

114.

Id.
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Some U.S. officials share this position.'1 5 A former special assistant for detainee policy in the DoD stated, "'You can't trust them
when they say they're not terrorists.""' 6
Despite the lack of legal authority or historical precedent for
releasing able-bodied enemy combatants during wartime, and
their proven propensity for recidivism, Rear Admiral McGarrah
nonetheless supports the ARB parole process because "'[w]e have
no desire to be the world's jailer.""' 7 By February 2006, the U.S.
government had released 270 detainees from Guant6.namo Bay."'
By March 2007, the total number of detainees released or transferred from Guant~inamo Bay had climbed to 390."' By January
of 2009, the number of detainees either released or transferred
from Guantdnamo Bay exceeded 500.120 Therefore, the story of
Yaser Esam Hamdi, one captured American A1-Qaeda member,
was the first gossamer strand of what became a colossal bureaucratic web. The U.S. government reacted to the Supreme Court's
narrow holding in Hamdi by adopting layer upon confusing layer
of procedures that the Court did not contemplate and the Geneva
Conventions do not require.
VII. RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION AND THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS

People criticize the United States for supposedly failing to adhere to the Geneva Conventions. This section compares requirements in the Geneva Conventions to existing procedures in Guantdnamo Bay in the realm of religious accommodation.
Under the Geneva Conventions, detaining powers must afford
detainees the right to practice their religion and attend religious
services."' The Conventions condition these rights on detainees

115.
116.
117.

See Mintz, supra note 97.
See id.
KYNDRA MILLER ROTUNDA, supra note 85, at 142 (quoting Rear Admiral McGar-

rah, Commander of OARDEC, Public Forum at George Mason University (Feb. 16, 2006)).
118. Id. (citing data provided by the DoD at a Feb. 16, 2006 public forum at George
Mason University).

119. News Release, U.S. Dep't of Defense, Guantanamo Bay 2006 Administrative Review Board Results Announced (Mar. 6, 2007), available at http://www.defenselink.mi
releases/release.aspx?releaseid= 10582.
120. Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009).
121. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 4,
art. 34.
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complying with disciplinary rules.'2 2 The Conventions also explain that relief societies like the Salvation Army or the Red
Cross, and specifically the International Committee of the Red
Cross, may provide prisoners with religious items like Bibles and
prayer books. 2 3 Prisoners can also receive "articles of a religious... character" through the mail.124 The Geneva Conventions
do not require a detaining power to provide religious articles to its
prisoners. 125
No law or treaty, including the Geneva Conventions, obligates
the United States to provide religious articles to the detainees.
However, the U.S. military does this anyway. In Guant~namo
Bay, the U.S military provides each detainee with a Koran, a
prayer cap, prayer beads, and prayer oil "as part of their basicissue items."126 It even distributes traditional Islamic prayer rugs
to those who are the best behaved.' 27 Another U.S.-run detention
camp in Iraq hosted a mural painting contest for the detainees
and awarded large editions of the Koran to the first and second
prize winners. 28 The U.S. government purchases Korans to give
detainees with taxpayers' dollars.
Aside from providing religious items, the U.S. military paints
arrows pointing to Mecca in each detainee's cell so detainees can
pray in the right direction, and it broadcasts the Islamic call to
prayer over loudspeakers five times each day. 29 It also assigns
U.S. Muslim chaplains-there were fourteen in the military
shortly after September 11, 200113 -to GuantAnamo Bay who ensure that camp commanders follow the rules of Islam and fully

122. Id.
123. Id. art. 125.
124. Id. art. 72.
125. See GENEVA III COMMENTARY, supranote 11, at 229.
126. Donna Miles, Joint Task Force Respects Detainees' Religious Practices, AM.
FORCES PRESS SERVICE, June 29, 2005, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
newsarticle.aspx?id=16267.
127. Id.
128. Lynne Steely, Abu Ghraib Detainees Enter Art Contest, ARMY NEWS SERVICE, Oct.
6, 2005, available at http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/rend.php?story-id-key=8024.
129. Miles, supra note 126.
130. In 1993 the U.S. Military had no Muslim Chaplains to minister to its 3,150 Muslims. Since that time, the number of Muslims in the U.S. military has increased and the
military allows Muslim Chaplains. One month after September 11, 2001, there were more
than 4,000 Muslims in uniform and fourteen Islamic chaplains ministering to them. Laurie Goodstein, A Nation Challenged: The Clergy; Military Clerics Balance Arms and Allah,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2001, at B1.
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accommodate detainees. Following advice from these chaplains,
the United States acknowledges Islamic holidays by providing
special meals that include imported seasonal fruits and nuts.' 3 '
The first year, at the end of Ramadan-the holiest time of year
for Muslims-the U.S. military even contemplated sacrificing a
goat for the detainees. 132 Ultimately, it decided not to do that to
avoid upsetting animal rights groups, such as People for the Ethical of Animals (PETA)."13 But in November 2006, the United
States hosted two holiday meals on two consecutive days because
detainees could not agree on the appropriate day to celebrate. To
avoid conflict, the U.S. military honored both days and paid for
two celebrations.134
In at least one incident, in Camp Bucca, Iraq, detainees turned
our generosity on us.' 35 Few people know about this incident because the military kept it quiet, and when the story finally broke,
it was only reported in one newspaper, the Washington Post, and
for only one day.'36 Camp Bucca is home of another U.S.-run detention camp, located in southern Iraq, just a few miles from the
Kuwait border.1 37 The United States accommodated detainees
even more at Camp Bucca than in Guantdnamo Bay. Detainees
lived in tan-colored tents or air-conditioned huts with approximately twenty people per unit. 38 They were free to roam into the
courtyards or stay inside.'3 9 During downtime, the detainees attended religious lessons organized by the inmates. 4 ° Inside the
confines of the prison, the U.S. military erected a tent for detainees to practice their religion.14 ' However, the U.S. military only
allowed detainees inside the makeshift mosque.' 42 The command

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
WASH.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

KYNDRA MILLER ROTUNDRA, supra note 85, at 61.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Steve Fainaru & Anthony Shadid, In Iraq Jail, Resistance Goes Underground,
POST, Aug. 24, 2005, at Al.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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er ordered the soldiers in charge of the camp not to go into the
tent.' It was specifically off-limits to U.S. personnel.'w
In fact, detainees were not devoting all of their time to religious
studies. 4 ' For months, more than 600 detainees worked in shifts,
undetected, digging an escape tunnel that continued under the
camp and led to a concealed trench just outside the gates. 146 They
dug at night, and then gradually distributed the tunnel dirt over
the soccer field during the day, one bag at a time. 47 Interestingly,
satellite imagery revealed fresh dirt covering the area, but the
United States overlooked its significance. 4 Additionally, soldiers
reported loose floorboards in several areas of the camp and small
piles of dirt, as if the ground was rising beneath them, and noted
that the showers and portable toilets were clogging, but did not
grasp the significance of these telling clues. 49
Detainees fortified the tunnel walls with a paste they made
from water and milk provided by the U.S. military in their rations. 50 Remarkably, at the last minute, before what would have
been one of the largest prison-breaks from any U.S.-run facility in
history, one of the detainees lost his gumption and reported the
plan to security guards on March 24, 2005.'15 Using bulldozers,
the guards leveled areas of the camp, destroying the tunnel underneath.1 52
Days after U.S. forces destroyed the tunnel, Camp Bucca suffered another blow from its inmates when a violent riot
erupted.'5 3 Inside the "off-limits" mosque, prisoners had created a
primitive but effective weapons cache, where they had stashed
concrete shards dug from the concrete around tent poles and4
15
bombs made from feces, socks, and flammable hand-sanitizer.

143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. Colonel James B. Brown, Commander of the 18th Military Police Brigade that
oversaw the three detention facilities in Iraq, said "(Tihe escape would have been one of
the largest from any U.S.-run facility in history." Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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For four days, the prisoners rioted.'5 5 They did not kill any U.S.
soldiers, but their impressive aim seriously injured several, including one officer who was hit in the eye by a chunk of cinderblock, fracturing his cheek in three places and breaking his
teeth.15 6 One soldier called the violence "absolutely incredible,"
due to the sheer number of rocks and the accuracy with which
they were thrown.5 7
The detainees managed to hold off U.S. forces for almost four
days. ' Finally, the United States called for backup. 9 A Black
Hawk helicopter arrived at the scene, and hundreds of soldiers
encircled the compound.1 6 ° Eventually, the detainees gave up
their efforts, and the United States restored order at Camp Bucca.

16 1

The United States had foolishly excluded guards from an area
where prisoners congregated privately, thereby inviting this disastrous situation. The United States exceeded the Geneva Conventions' requirements, but these actions backfired.
Commentary to the Geneva Conventions explains that while
POWs should have an "adequate" place to practice their religion,
62
the detaining power can use that place for other purposes too.'
It is not required to set aside a place devoted exclusively to religious practices. Therefore, under the Geneva Conventions, it
would be sufficient if the tent were both a mosque and a dining
facility, or served some other dual purpose. The Conventions do
not contemplate a situation where the detention camp commanders only allow its prisoners, and no others, access to certain locations.
The Geneva Conventions state that POWs must follow the military disciplinary routine of their captors in order to preserve
their right to religious latitude. 63 This is similar to the standard

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

GENEVA III COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 225.
163. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 4,
art. 34.
162.
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applied in U.S. prisons. In O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, the Supreme Court said that prison officials could impinge on prisoners'
right to exercise their religion for reasons related to legitimate
prison management.1 64 The Court upheld a regulation regarding
prisoner work duties that precluded Muslim prisoners from attending religious services on Friday afternoons, as their faith required. 65'
However, despite the problems at Camp Bucca and the Geneva
Conventions' relatively modest requirements for religious accommodation, the United States continues to exceed these requirements. In June 2005, three months after the Camp Bucca
riot, senior officials testified before Congress and explained that
at Guantdnamo Bay, religious practices are incorporated into
"nearly every aspect of camp life."16 6
Army Command Sergeant Major Anthony Mendez explained
that during the "call to prayer" the United States guarantees
Guantdnamo Bay detainees twenty minutes of "uninterrupted
time."16 Despite the problems in Camp Bucca, Sergeant Major
Mendez made clear that certain items remain "off-limits" to
guards in Guantdnamo Bay. He stated, "'The rule of thumb for
the guards is that you will not touch the Koran'. . . 'That's the
bottom line."'168 Neither the U.S. military nor anyone else who
testified mentioned Camp Bucca.
VIII. CAMP DISCIPLINE AND THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
At the prison camp in Guantdnamo Bay, the military does not
have a disciplinary system to hold detainees accountable for
crimes they commit while detained. The Geneva Conventions recognize that maintaining order in a prison camp is very important.
The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War devotes an entire chapter to camp discipline. The Commentary to the Convention explains:

164. 482 U.S. 342, 351-53 (1987), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-41, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb4 (2006)).
165. OLone, 482 U.S. at 353.
166. Miles, supra note 126.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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The prime purpose of measures of discipline is to ensure that the
prisoner of war remains in the hands of the Detaining Power, so that
he can neither do any harm to that Power within the camp, nor by
escaping be enabled to take up arms again. It must not be forgotten
that his life has been sared only on condition that he is no longer a
danger to the enemy.

The Commentary further states that it is "essential for the implementation of the Convention that prisoners of war should be
subject to military discipline." 7 0 Under the Geneva Conventions,
detainees are even required to salute the detaining powers. 7 ' But
that never happens in Guantdnamo Bay-detainees do not salute
their captors.
Articles 82 through 98 of the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War discuss disciplinary systems
within POW camps. Article 82 states,
A prisoner of war shall be subject to the laws, regulations and orders
in force in the armed forces of the Detaining Power; the Detaining
Power shall be justified in taking judicial or disciplinary measures in
respect of any offence committed
by a prisoner of war against such
172
laws, regulations or orders.

Therefore, under the Geneva Conventions, the United States
should bring detainees to trial and sentence them for their crimes
committed against U.S. prison guards in Guantdnamo Bay. Under the Conventions, the United States could apply several different disciplinary sanctions including fines, discontinuance of privileges, fatigue duties, and confinement. 73 But, there is no
disciplinary system in Guantdnamo Bay, and the United States
does not hold detainees accountable for their crimes and offenses.
For this reason, the problems continue and U.S. prison guards
are at risk.
IX. CONCLUSION

The United States has been criticized for failing to follow the
rule of law in Guantdnamo Bay. But, the "rule of law" that ap-

169.
170.
171.
art. 39.
172.
173.

GENEVA III COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 238.
Id.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 4,
Id. art. 82.
Id. art. 89.
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plies to detainees held during a time of war is the Geneva Conventions, which guarantee only basic procedural rights, even for
POWs. In many respects, operations in Guantdnamo Bay actually
exceed what the Geneva Conventions require. The U.S. military
has adopted more robust procedures for Article 5 tribunals than
the Geneva Conventions require and has applied the Hamdi decision in a way that provides greater procedural protections for detainees. In addition, the U.S. military has established unprecedented CSRTs and ARBs; allows more religious accommodation
than the Geneva Conventions require; and has not instituted disciplinary proceedings in Guantinamo Bay for detainees who fail
to follow camp rules.
Therefore, although the U.S. military has been widely criticized
for failing to adhere to the rule of law, a careful examination of
the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War and its commentary reveals the opposite. The United States
adheres to,174 and even exceeds, Geneva Convention principles in
Guantinamo Bay.

174. Soon after taking office, President Obama required the Pentagon to examine the
conditions at Guantdnamo Bay to determine whether they complied with the Geneva Conventions. The Pentagon recently completed its study and concluded that conditions in
Guantdnamo Bay comply with the Geneva Conventions. Josh Meyer, Pentagon Calls
GuantanamoHumane, L.A. TIMES, at A13. A Pentagon official stated: "The bottom line is
that the report found that Guantinamo is in compliance with the Geneva conventions,
which we have maintained for several years. So the report essentially validated our procedures and process.'" Id.

